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A 3 X 3 CLASSIFICATION OF
SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION'
WILLEM B. DREES
(University ofTwente, Enschede, and
Vrije Universitaet, Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
The variety of discussions on the relationship between science and re-
ligion is confusing. In this paper I propose a classification of areas of discus-
sion. This classification distinguishes three views of religion and three
challenges related to the rise of the sciences. Therefore, the classification has
3 x 3 areas. It is argued that this classification has certain advantages over
other existing ones.
1. THREE CHALLENGES
A synthesis of religious convictions and pre-scientific insights is often
assumed to have characterised the late Middle Ages. A major example of a
systematic synthesis is the work of Thomas Aquinas (13th century). A liter-
ary expression of an integration of theology, ethics, politics and geocentric
astronomy is Dante's Commedia about hell, purgatory and paradise (early
14th century). In discerning the order of things, the higher creatures trace
God's footsteps, as Beatrice tells the poet in the first canto of Paradise. In
such a medieval synthesis, ideas from Greek philosophers (Plato, Aristotle),
from Scripture and from earlier theologians came together. Medieval views
had a static character and a hierarchical structure, and they were geocentric.
The order, understood in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of 'natural place' was
not merely understood as something factual. The order was also normative,
as is still reflected in some uses of the words 'natural' and 'counter-natural'.
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It is dubious whether a single and unique medieval synthesis actually
existed; conflicts between faith and philosophy occurred, no system was
complete and comprehensive, and people disagreed: "The learned Latin
culture of the 13th century was no more unitary than ours" (Mark D. Jor-
dan).2 However, as a construction of later times the mythical medieval syn-
thesis offers a nice contrast to our situation.
a. New knowledge separates us from any medieval synthesis. The geo-
centricism of medieval astronomy has been abandoned. In biology and
geology static views have been replaced by an evolutionary one with time
scales far exceeding any scholarly chronology based on the Bible and on
knowledge about the history of other cultures in Egypt and Mesopotamia.
Not only have we become aware of a long pre-human history of the earth,
but evolutionary biology and the neurosciences have given humanity a new
position among other living beings. Some people have attempted to adapt
theology to contemporary changes in our view of the world, for instance by
seeing God's creative activity in the evolutionary process. Ascribing the
problems for theology to "an outmoded world picture" (Wildiers 1982, 235)
is, however, incomplete and inadequate. It is not only the knowledge of
nature that has changed.
b. Ideas about the nature of knowledge have changed as well. Methods
for acquiring knowledge have changed, as is exemplified by the role of
experiments and of mathematical idealisation. At the same time, with the rise
of science the conception of science changed. The changes at this level
during the seventeenth century "were those that most clearly, in retrospect,
mark this century as the age of the scientific revolution" (McMullin 1990,
28). The ideal of purely deductive or purely inductive knowledge was
gradually replaced by the ideal of hypothetico-deductive (or retroductive)
reasoning. The eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant made the
creative role of the subject more explicit. According to him, the world as it is
in itself is inaccessible; the accessible, knowable world is the world as we
describe it in terms of our categories. Subsequent developments have shown
that Kant's categories and forms of perception, such as Euclidean space,
were not necessary. But the insight still stands that knowledge is shaped by
our categories, and not only by the reality it purports to be about. The shift to
the subject of knowledge was followed by an increased emphasis on the role
of language and context, by a decline in the belief in secure foundations of
knowledge, and by disputes over the demarcation between science and other
human activities. Theology has also responded to the emphasis on the role of
the human subject, for instance by focusing on the personal (e.g., Martin
Buber's distinction between 'I-thou' relations and 'I-it' relations).
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c. A third change regards our appreciation of the -world. The medieval
synthesis took the world to be God's good creation. Today some consider the
world existentially meaningless, neutral or ambivalent, whereas other think-
ers, both secular and religious ones, find our reality meaningful. The emer-
gence of mixed feelings about the world can be illustrated by the poem John
Donne wrote in 1611 during a time of turmoil in Europe, with the oft quoted
line, "And new philosophy calls all in doubt". It is dubious whether the
poem's original intention was a lamentation over the loss of the medieval
world view, but this passage has often been used to refer to this loss.3 Over a
century later, the changing appreciation of the world is exemplified by the
cultural impact of the earthquake that destroyed Lisbon in 1755. The French
philosopher Voltaire gave his Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne (1756) thé
subtitle "Or an examination of the axiom 'All is well'". This theme returns in
Voltaire's novel Candide ou l'optimisme (1759). There the philosopher
Pangloss defends the view that this is the best of all possible worlds. The
more Pangloss, who stands for Leibniz, argues his case, the less convincing it
becomes. Another illustration of changes in the appreciation of the world,
again a century later, can be taken from Dostoyevsky's The Brothers
Karamazov. One of the brothers, Ivan, wants to return to God his ticket of
entry into the world. The suffering in this world is not justified by heavenly
meaning. "And if the sufferings of children go to swell the sum of sufferings
which was necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the truth is not worth
such a price."4
Changes in the appreciation of the world have affected theology as
well. This is most explicit in those theologians who have moved from an
understanding of God in metaphysical terms, say God as the Ground of
Being, to an understanding of God as being on the side of the victims or of
the poor. The 'Death of God' discussion of the 1960s reflects the stronger
emphasis on human autonomy in creating knowledge, but it also fits in with a
strong sense of the reality of horror and injustice in the world.
2. EXISTING CLASSIFICATIONS OF DISCUSSIONS ON RELIGION-
AND-SCIENCE
We have just considered challenges to religion as they have arisen in
the last couple of centuries. Below, I will argue that it is helpful to distin-
guish three different views of religion, which emphasise truth, experience,
and tradition. Together, these will result in a classification of discussions on
the relationship between science and religion in which nine areas are distin-
guished. Before coming to my proposal, I will first point out some differ-
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ences with existing classifications, especially one which is widely used,
namely the one provided by Ian Barbour.
Conflict, independence, dialogue and integration.
The field of religion and science is regularly classified by means of four
categories, here quoted from Ian Barbour (1988, 1990: 3-30; Barbour 1966
offers similar distinctions):
• .Conflict
1.1. Scientific materialism
1.2. Biblical literalism
2. Independence
2.1. Contrasting methods
2.2 Differing languages
3. Dialogue
3.1. Boundary questions
3.2. Methodological parallels
4. Integration
4.1 Doctrinal reformulation
4.2. Systematic synthesis
The categories 'conflict', 'independence', 'dialogue' and 'integration'
express strategies for handling conflicts: choosing either one position or the
other (conflict), separating the contending claims as different and independ-
ent, and adapting one's views to some extent (dialogue) or accommodating
both claims in an interwoven whole (integration).
The four categories do not pay attention to the question as to which
kind of religion is supposed to be in conflict with, independent from, or to be
integrated with, which kind of science. However, the conclusion that there is
a 'conflict' between science and religion (or that they are independent, or that
they can be integrated), can be drawn for various reasons. Classification by
means of general strategical stances may be helpful, for instance in a socio-
logical survey (e.g.. Barker 1981). However, such a classification is not the
most helpful way of approaching the field in a study which focuses on the
intellectual problems of the interaction. In that case, the central issues should
be the underlying perceptions of science, of religion, and of the problems
involved in relating these two human enterprises. This brings us to consid-
erations about the nature of knowledge, especially the relation between
theories and experience, and to considerations regarding the nature of reality,
the metaphysical significance, if any, of the content of scientific theories.
Barbour is in a position to dismiss 'scientific materialism' by lumping it
together with 'biblical literalism' under the heading conflict. The suggestion
is that both are mistaken in relying on an all-too-straightforward realism with
respect to texts and theories. This is an attractive rhetorical move, but not
adequate since it neglects the fact that the challenges are different. 'Biblical
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literalism' ('creationism') collides with new knowledge and with modern
ideas about the nature of knowledge, whereas 'materialism' tries to accom-
modate maximally to these new insights. 'Scientific materialism' is much
more of an intellectual challenge than Biblical literalism. Biblical literalism
moves from experiences, in this case the words of a text, directly to convic-
tions. The path from experience to theories is much more elaborate in sci-
ence. This distance between convictions and experience carries over from
science to 'scientific materialism', which is therefore - at least in this re-
spect - much more sophisticated than 'Biblical literalism'.
Clustering by strategical stance also lumps together various views of
independence. This too is unsatisfactory, as underlying views of religion may
be very different. For instance, some pleas for independence are based upon
the distinction between primary and secondary causation, maintaining a
metaphysical understanding of religion as dealing with the Primary Cause of
everything. But independence might also be the strategy adopted when
religion is understood as dealing with moral and emotional issues in human
existence. It is not illuminating to treat such different ways of separating
science and religion together.
The scheme not only lumps together arguments and positions which are
different in fundamental respects, but also separates views which are similar
in important respects. A materialistic view of religion, here listed under
'conflict', may be close to a metaphysical 'integration', since both expand
the realms of religion and science to encompass the whole of reality.
Viggo Mortensen (1987, 1988) uses two major categories to describe
the field, restriction and expansion. One might defend the co-existence of
science and religion by arguing that they deal with different, restricted as-
pects of reality. Or one might consider their relation by arguing that each
deals, in principle, with the whole of reality. The attractive feature of this
distinction between restriction and expansion is that it focuses immediately
on the underlying views of science and of religion. Though the focus on
underlying views of the scope of science and of religion is attractive, the two
categories do not pay attention to the way the challenges to religion deriving
from science are perceived.
Another scheme, which conceives of eight (4x2) possible relationships
between science and theology, has been developed by Peacocke (1981,
xiiiff; see also 1993, 20) and Russell (1985, 49f). Russell distinguishes four
'dimensions' in Peacocke's proposal, namely approaches, languages, atti-
tudes, and objects. Along each of these four dimensions, science and theol-
ogy may be considered as similar (and thus fairly close to each other,
positively related) or dissimilar. I appreciate the four dimensions, which I
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understand as referring to epistemological, semantical, axiological, and
ontological issues. My list of three challenges is somewhat similar, except
that I add explicitly the issue of the content of scientific knowledge. I also
refer to epistemological and axiological issues; I prefer to treat issues of
semantics and ontology when they come up in the reflection on knowledge
and views of knowledge, rather than that I list them separately in advance.
Whether reflections in these four areas of discussion lead to a "positive and
reconciling" or a "negative and non-interacting" relationship (Peacocke
1993, 20) is to be seen; I would not make the result an element in the classi-
fication itself, and I doubt that a single scale from negative to positive is
adequate here.
A disadvantage of this scheme is that it is restricted to theology, em-
phasising "affirmations of Christian theology" (Peacocke 1981, xiii). Such a
view of religion "emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses
the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or
truth claims about objective realities" (Lindbeck 1984, 16). In my opinion
this leaves important areas of discussion out of sight. The natural sciences
have consequences for theology, understood as cognitive affirmations, but
also for experience and tradition, which are central notions in other views of
theology. Therefore, I propose a more elaborate scheme of nine areas of
discussion. Before coming to that scheme, I will briefly present three differ-
ent views of religion.
3. THREE VIEWS OF RELIGION
Above I have listed three challenges to religion as it relates to the natu-
ral sciences and other developments that have occurred over the last few
centuries: a. new knowledge, b. new views of knowledge and c. a less positive
appreciation of the world.
Our understanding of religion has also diversified. Each particular way
that religion is understood gives a certain shape to its interaction with the
natural sciences. George Lindbeck ( 1984) has attempted to clarify the nature
of ecumenical agreements by distinguishing between three views of religions
and religious doctrine. I will adapt his categories here for my purposes. The
three views of religion will be exemplified below, with the explication of the
classificatory scheme. They are core elements which are combined in various
ways in actual religions and theologies.
1. Cognitive claims are central to some views of religion. Religion, and
especially its systematic articulation in theology, is an attempt to grasp the
true, ultimate nature of reality. George Lindbeck argued in his The Nature of
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Doctrine (1984, 16) that such a propositional-cognitivist view "was the
approach of traditional orthodoxies (as well as many heterodoxies), but it
also has certain affinities to the outlook on religion adopted by much modern
Anglo-American analytical philosophy with its preoccupation with the
cognitive or informative meaningfulness of religious utterances".
2. Religious experience, or religious interpretations of experience, are
at the heart of religion according to other views, especially in liberal posi-
tions influenced by Schleiermacher. Lindbeck calls this an 'experiential-
expressivist' view of religion; "it interprets doctrines as noninformative and
nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations"
(1984, 16).
3. Religions can also be seen as traditions by which people live, which
shape their lives, both individually and communally. This aligns well with
anthropological and sociological approaches. Lindbeck speaks of a 'cultural-
linguistic' view of religion. Religions resemble languages and forms of life;
they are "idioms for the construction of reality and the living of life" (18).
4. THE 3 X 3 CLASSIFICATION
Given these two ways of structuring the arena of debate, in terms of the
three challenges to religion and in terms of the three views of religion, a total
of nine areas of debate may be distinguished. These are areas of discussion; a
single author may well be engaged in more than one of these. Ideally, each
theological or philosophical proposal would cover all these areas; the scheme
can be seen as a way to delineate the target area.5 However, in practice, most
authors focus on one area, a single column, or a single row, or at least have a
characteristic emphasis there. For instance, the theologian Hefner writes in
intense dialogue with an anthropological understanding of religion, and thus
most of his writings primarily deal with the areas of discussion in the third
column. However, this does not keep him from cognitive claims. Rather,
"myth provides a picture of the way things really are" (Hefner 1993, 202).
One could recover the various strategies distinguished by Barbour in
some of these areas, especially in the one which focuses on cognitive ele-
ments in religion in relation to new knowledge. I prefer to distinguish these
strategies as follows: i. conflicts over specific issues; ii. separation of do-
mains and claims; i i i . partial adaptation, for instance by developing models
which borrow from the sciences to explicate religious notions; and iv. the
development of an integrated view, and the debates over various integrated
systems, or world views.
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After summarising the scheme, I will give some examples of discus-
sions on relations between science and religion in the various areas.
Character of religion
Challenge
• New knowledge
b New views of
knowledge
c Appreciation of the
world
1 Cognitive claims
la Content-oriented
i Conflicts
it Separation
in Partial adaptation
iv Integration
Ib Philosophy of science and
opportunities for theology
le A new covenant between
humans and the Universe?
2 Experience
2a Positive New opportuni-
ties for experiential religion''
Challenge Explanations of
religious experience in
neurospycho logical terms
2b Philosophical defences of
the legitimacy of taking
religious experiences seriously
as data
2c Ambivalence of the world
and implications for the
concept of God
3 Tradition
U Religious traditions as
products of evolution
3b Religious traditions as
' language games', but not
thereby exempt from being
approached in evolutionary
terms
3c Ultimate tolerance and a basis
for hope, or are religions local
traditions without universal
claim''
Figure 1 : A classification for areas of discussion concerning the relation-
ship of religion and science, with some examples.
Classifications like those of Barbour, and of Peacocke and Russell, dis-
cussed above, give most prominence to the way cognitive claims in religion
(theology) and in science are related. This is only the first column, and often
only one area (la), in the scheme proposed here. And especially with respect
to this area I intend to make it clear that debates do not stand in isolation, but
require consideration of other views of religion (other columns) and other
views of the challenges (other horizontal rows).
la. Cognitive claims in religion and new knowledge about the world.
i. Various conflicts have arisen over the truth of the Bible: the world
either came into being a few millennia ago or it has existed for billions of
years; there has either been a world-wide flood or there has not; the species
are either fixed or they are not; the Sun either stood still at Gibeon (Joshua
10: 12) or it did not, etc. Conflicts, such as those related to Galileo and
Darwin, seem to be about knowledge and cognitive claims in the Bible. As I
have argued elsewhere (Drees 1996, 54-77), the events also reflected con-
flicts among believers about the understanding of religion and conflicts
among scientists about the interpretation of science. Hence, whereas the
popular image might be that science and religion have collided over facts,
further analysis shows that many more issues are involved, such as the
flexibility of religious expressions (other strategies), the understanding of
religion (other columns) and of knowledge (other rows).
26 W.B. DREES
ii. Separation as a strategy may be a consequence of new knowledge,
say biological explanations for the apparent design of organisms and organs.
However, if the strategy is separation, the discussion is not so much about
details of new knowledge, but rather about the nature and scope of scientific
understanding (the next row). As examples of supporters of such a position
one might consider those who adhere to the distinction between primary and
secondary causes, but also my own religious view of naturalism in combina-
tion with a naturalistic view of all phenomena.
iii. Examples of partial adaptation of religious views to new knowledge
are attempts to find a model for divine action in the context of quantum
physics, chaotic processes or via top-down causation (e.g., Russell et al.
1993, 1995).
iv. Among attempts to develop an integrated world view have been Pi-
erre Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary theology, and process theology
drawing on the metaphysical notions of Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles
Hartshorne. A less-open attitude towards religion characterises some scien-
tists who dismiss religion as a cognitive mistake which is intelligible on the
basis of our psychological constitution and our evolutionary past.
Ib. Cognitive claims in religion and the nature of knowledge
The idea that theology should adopt the methodology of the sciences,
or that recent insights in general epistemology and semantics provide a
fruitful perspective for religion has been defended by various philosophers of
religion. As one of them claims, and more seem to believe, "Methodology,
not subject matter, has kept theology trailing behind in the age of science"
(Murphy 1990, 127). According to Nancey Murphy, relevant parts of theol-
ogy could be structured as a Lakatosian research programme, including
features such as a hard core, auxiliary hypotheses and novel data. Hence, the
cognitive claims of theology deserve as much credibility as the cognitive
claims of science.
A weaker assimilation in methodological and epistemological respects
has been defended by Ian Barbour, when he listed similarities and dissimi-
larities between science and religious belief (Barbour 1974, 69; 1990, 65-92;
see also Peacocke 1984, 41-44). Thus, some argue that every theological
model or metaphor drawing on the sciences has an 'is' and an 'is-not' com-
ponent. In my view, such a qualification is important but insufficient (Drees
1994, 258f).
A 3 X 3 CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION
le. Cognitive claims about the meaning of the Universe. In their popu-
lar book on self-organisation, Order out of Chaos, Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle
Stengers wrote of a 'new covenant' between man and nature. The physicist
Freeman Dyson saw in the fundamental characteristics of the universe an
indication of purpose, as if the universe in some sense knew that we were
going to arrive on the scene; "the universe is an unexpectedly hospitable
place" (Dyson 1979, 251). In writing thus, they opposed other scientists who
had come to the opposite conclusion. The biologist Jacques Monod, for
instance, described everything as the result of pure chance; there would be no
objective foundation for meaning or purpose. And near the end of his popular
book. The First Three Minutes the cosmologist Steven Weinberg wrote: "The
more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless"
(Weinberg 1977, 155). This debate is not so much about the possibility or
plausibility of any concept of a transcendent God, or even an active God, but
rather about the way we understand the universe, our place in it, and perhaps
its long-term or ultimate future. Within this debate the distinction between
conflict, separation, partial adaptation and more fundamental integration
seems less fruitful - though one might consider Weinberg and Monod as
authors who argue for a view of conflict (envisaging a conflict between
human meaning, perhaps even human psychological needs, and the universe
as we know it), whereas Prigogine tends towards a partial (or more complete)
integration of humanistic concerns and his interpretation of scientific in-
sights.
2a. Religious interpretations of experience and changing knowledge.
Some see new opportunities for an experiential religion. These include
'religious empiricists' who seek continuity with the Christian tradition6 as
well as authors who represent 'New Age' ideas. Among the sciences, quan-
tum physics and ecology attract most interest among those who seek to
develop religion with an experiential emphasis. Such approaches typically
aim at integration, either partial or complete.
Research on the differences between the functioning of the left and
right hemispheres of the human cortex has led some to claim that ordinary
perception and analysis may be located in the left hemisphere whereas the
capacity for experiences of the Absolute would be located in the right hemi-
sphere (e.g., d'Aquili, Ashbrook). In this way, a separation of scientific
knowing and religious knowing can help their integration within a larger
framework, which is itself linked with the neurosciences. In the end it is an
attempt at integration to understand "intense religious and spiritual experi-
ence in a more scientific form" (d'Aquili, Newberg 1993, 178). Along these
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lines, one finds an entry under 'Neuroepistemology' in the Encyclopedia of
Religion (d'Aquili 1987). However, the same neurosciences have led others
to another conclusion: religious experience is not a special kind of experi-
ence, but rather an interpretation given to certain experiences. Explaining
religious experiences almost amounts to explaining them away.
2b. Religious experience and the nature of knowledge. Some philoso-
phers of religion, especially Richard Swinburne and William P. Alston, have
argued for the legitimacy of religious experiences as data for theology.
Another discussion which would, in my view, fit in this area of the scheme is
Nancey Murphy's appeal to communal discernment as resulting in novel data
for theology.
2c. An experiential view of religion and the appreciation of the world.
Some American 'religious naturalists' (see above, 2a), such as Bernard
Loomer and William Dean, want to avoid reference to anything inaccessible.
There is no relief from the ambiguities of life and death in some realm be-
yond space and time. Thus, in order to maintain their self-imposed restriction
to the experiential realm they prefer to accept ambiguity in God's goodness
rather than a resolution of evil through a notion of ultimacy beyond history.7
3a. New knowledge and religion as a tradition. On the naturalistic view
that will be presented here, religious traditions are products of evolution. As
evolved traditions, they have been closely intertwined with the evolution of
morality, and more widely with the evolution of humanity. This view of reli-
gion and morality could draw upon Richard Alexander's Biology of Moral
Systems and Ralph Burhoe's view of the role of religion in the evolution of
the human species.
3b. Religion as a tradition and new views of knowledge. Drawing on
the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, some defend the view that religious
traditions should be seen as 'language games' or, drawing on Michael Po-
lanyi, as implicit, personal, background knowledge. This seems to grant such
traditions a kind of immunity: How could one consider such a framework or
background without leaving it, and thereby claiming a detached point of view
which does not exist? Against this immunity I believe that the observation
that understanding is always relative to a framework does not exclude further
analysis of its strengths and weaknesses (Drees 1996, 230-244)..
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3c. Traditions and appreciation of the world. The few theologians who
take the evolutionary, functional view of religion (as a position in area 3a)
very seriously, seek to move beyond a functional view of religious traditions
as adaptations which have structured societies. They make claims which
transcend any local context, and thereby move from function to truth. The
theologian Philip Hefner writes that the locus of the God-question has be-
come "the trustworthiness of the processes of evolution upon which man
depends" (Hefner 1970, 10). Thus, he asks "whether there is ultimately a
resonance between man and his world or a dissonance - whether man is
fundamentally at home in his world or out of phase with it" (Hefner 1970,
11 f) And the theologian Gerd Theissen seeks to defend the position that
reality is, ultimately, tolerant and graceful. I agree with them that religious
traditions are to be seen in an evolutionary perspective. However, their shift
from functional adaptations in local contexts to ontological claims of univer-
sal scope does not seem successful. It is more promising, in my opinion, to
accept religious traditions within an integrated, naturalistic understanding of
reality as rich, functional adaptations to certain historical contexts in combi-
nation with a religious appreciation of naturalism, since reality and its intel-
ligibility do not explain themselves.
A concluding remark. The variety of positions that can be located in the
3 x 3 scheme is in various ways relevant to an argument for a naturalistic
view of reality, including religion, and a religious view of naturalism (Drees
1996). Some positions clearly present an alternative view of reality, espe-
cially those that seek to defend specific theistic cognitive claims (first col-
umn) or the more holist or organic views espoused by 'religious empiricists'
(2a). Other parts of the scheme are helpful in understanding religion; this
holds for the second, and especially for the third column. On this approach,
religion would be one of the phenomena to be explained, rather than a com-
peting explanation.
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32 W.B. DREES
NOTES
1. The author expresses his gratitude towards Niels H. Gregersen, Peter Kirschenmann, Arthur
Peacocke, Helmut Reich, Robert J. Russell, Christoph Wassermann and various others for
helpful criticisms of and comments on an earlier version of this scheme. During the Fifth
European Conference on Science and Theology, Russell suggested to call it a typology
rather than a classification, since the latter term might suggest that the various categories
are mutually exclusive. However, I prefer to speak of a classification, since 'typology' car-
ries other undesirable connotations, of symbolic representation, whereas classification may
be, as intended here, "a useful schema for stating some of the problems and disputes" (R.
Abelson in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1967), 314). This paper presents a further development of ideas presented at the 4th
ESSSAT conference (Drees 1994); these issues have been discussed at greater length
(Drees 1996)
2. This threefold objection is taken from Mark D. Jordan's lecture '"By whom all things were
made': Christology and Cosmology in the Thirteenth Century", where he develops his case
for tension and diversity by considering Roger Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure.
Lecture held at the conference 'Our Knowledge of God, Christ, and Nature' at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, April 1993.
3. Stephen Toulmin (1990, 65ff.) is one of the advocates of the view that the poem is about
the decline of the cosmopolis, the sense of cosmic and social order. Toulmin's reading is,
however, disputed. Manley (1963, 44) claims that "the passage is usually taken out of
context to illustrate the impact of scientific rationalism on the Medieval world picture".
Donne's poem can be seen as a methodical religious meditation, similar to the Jesuit exer-
cises (Martz 1947).
4. Quoted from the Constance Gamett Translation, revised by R.E. Matlaw (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1976), p. 225f.
5. I owe this metaphor to Arthur Peacocke, who used it during the Fifth European Conference
on Science and Theology (Freising, March 1994).
6. E.g Birch (1990), Birch and Cobb (1981), Dean (1986), Ferré (1993), Frankenberry (1992),
Griffin (1989), Peters (1992).
7. Another example of discussion in this area is (Stone 1992) with a preface, critical on this
issue, by Langdon Gilkey.
